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SIMPLE EXAMPLE
OF WEAK MODAL LOGIC
BASED ON INTUITIONISTIC CORE
TOMASZ WITCZAK
Abstract. In this paper we present simple example of propositional logic
which has one modal operator and is based on intuitionistic core. This system
is very weak in modal sense - e.g. rules of regularity or monotonicity do not
hold. It has complete semantics composed of possible worlds equipped with
neighborhoods and pre-order relation. We discuss certain restrictions imposed
on those structures. Also, we present characterization of axiom 4 known from
logic S4 .
1. Introduction
Intuitionistic modal logics are often interpreted in terms of bi-relational struc-
tures. Such frames contain two relations between possible worlds: ≤ (pre-order,
responsible for the intuitionistic aspect of logic) and R (modal reachability). This
approach was widely investigated in [1], [8] and [7]. In [9] we established sound
and complete semantics based on the notion of neighborhoods. In fact, we modi-
fied typical neighborhood semantics for intuitionism (presented in [5]) by removing
superset axiom. Thus, we could speak not only about minimal neighborhoods of
worlds - but also about maximal ones. We assumed that w  ϕ iff ϕ is satisfied in
each world of maximal w-neighborhood. This definition (similar to the one used by
Kojima in [3]) was closely related with well-known relational definition of necessity
(both for classical and intuitionistic systems) which states that w  ϕ iff ϕ is
satisfied in each world visible from w in modal sense.
In the present paper our approach is different - close to the typical neighborhood
definition. Thus we assume (among other conditions) that formula ϕ is forced
in w iff the whole V (ϕ) belongs to the family of w-neighborhoods. In our earlier
research we could quite easily transform neighborhood structures into bi-relational
frames. Now we do not even expect such duality - because our aim is to point out
those features of neighborhoods which cannot be simulated (at least in any easy
way) by relational structures.
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At the same time our system is very weak in its modal aspect. It is because in
classical setting neighborhoods show their usefulness especially in the universe of
non-normal logics (see [6] for longer discussion). In some sense we isolate axiom
T . Quite interesting question was how to define meaning of ϕ and how combine
≤ with neighborhoods to obtain intuitionistic monotonicity of forcing. We show
certain simple solution and some of its possible modifications.
Recently, we found out that investigations in the same field are provided by
Dalmonte, Grellois and Olivetti ([2]). Some of their intuitions and concepts are
similar to ours but there are certain differences. For example, our calculi is essen-
tialy mono-modal (and our reflexions upon possibility operator are only secondary).
Moreover, our logic always contains axiom T . As for the semantics, we did not use
”two-dimensional” neighborhoods but only typical ones.
2. Alphabet and language
Below we list basic components of our language:
(1) PV is a fixed denumerable set of propositional variables p, q, r, s, ...
(2) Logical connectives and operators are ∧, ∨, →, ⊥ and .
(3) The only derived connective is ¬ (which means that ¬ϕ is a shortcut for
ϕ→ ⊥).
Formulas are generated recursively in a standard manner: if ϕ, ψ are wff’s then
also ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ → ψ and ϕ. Semantical interpretation of this language will
be presented in the next section. Attention: ⇐,⇒ and ⇔ are used only on the
level of meta-language (which is classical).
3. Intuitionistic neighborhood semantics
3.1. The definition of frame. Our basic structure is a pre-ordered neighborhood
frame for intuitionistic modal logic (pn1 -frame) defined as it follows:
Definition 3.1. pn1 -frame is a tripe 〈W,N ,≤〉 where ≤ is a partial order on W
and N is a function from W into P (P (W )) such that:
(1) w ≤ v, v ∈ X ⊆W,X ∈ Nw ⇒ X ∈ Nv
3.2. Valuation and model. Having frame, we can establish model:
SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF WEAK MODAL LOGIC BASED ON INTUITIONISTIC CORE 3
Definition 3.2. pn1 -model is a quadruple 〈W,N ,≤, V 〉 where 〈W,N ,≤〉 is pn1 -
frame and V is a function from PV into P (W ) such that: if w ∈ V (q) and w ≤ v
then v ∈ V (q).
Definition 3.3. For every pn1 -model M = 〈W,N ,≤, V 〉, forcing of formulas in
a world w ∈W is defined inductively:
(1) w 1 ⊥
(2) w  q ⇔ w ∈ V (q) for any q ∈ PV
(3) w  ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔ w  ϕ or w  ψ
(4) w  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ w  ϕ and w  ψ
(5) w  ϕ→ ψ ⇔ v 1 ϕ or v  ψ for each v ∈ W such that w ≤ v
(6) w  ϕ ⇔ w  ϕ and {z ∈W ; z  ϕ} ∈ Nw
As we can see, ϕ is forced if V (ϕ) ∈ Nw (just like in the classical approach)
but we also require that ϕ should be satisfied in an intuitionistic sense. Thus, we
obtain theorem about monotonicity of forcing:
Theorem 3.4. In every pn1 -model M = 〈W,N ,≤, V 〉: if w  ϕ and w ≤ v, then
v  ϕ.
Proof. The proof goes by induction over the complexity of formulas. Almost all
cases are easy (or rather just like in standard intuitionistic calculus). Thus, we
shall discuss only the modal case.
Assume that ϕ = γ. Suppose that w  ϕ. Thus w  γ and {z ∈ W ; z 
γ} ∈ Nw. Let us take v ∈ W such that w ≤ v. Of course v  ϕ (by induction
hypothesis). Thus, v ∈ {z ∈ W ; z  γ} - which means that v ∈ X ∈ Nw. From (1)
we can say that X = V (γ) ∈ Nv. Hence, v  γ and finally v  ϕ.

3.3. About bi-relational approach. In general, there is no universal standard
of bi-relational approach for intuitionistic modal logics. There are however some
clues or some popular and widely accepted notions. For example, many authors
agree that forcing of ϕ should be defined in a following way:
w  ϕ⇔ for each v ∈ W such that wRv, v  ϕ
It means that formula ϕ should be accepted in each world which is reachable
from w by means of relation R (modal reachability or visibility). One could say
that in our system we should use another, slightly more complicated clause (to hold
connection with our basic definition):
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w  ϕ⇔ w  ϕ and for each v ∈W such that wRv, v  ϕ
Be as it may, we can show that in general it is impossible to transform an arbi-
trary pn1 -model into the bi-relational one. For this, we use simple argument pre-
sented by Pacuit in [6] for classical modal setting. Suppose that we have pn1 -model
M = {W,N ,≤, V } such that: W = {w, v},Nw = {{w}},Nv = {{v}}, V (ϕ) =
{w, v}, V (ψ) = {w} and ≤ is empty. Now we can say that w  (ϕ ∧ ψ) - because
w  ϕ ∧ ψ and {z ∈ W ; z  ϕ ∧ ψ} = {w} ∈ Nw. At the same time, w 1 ϕ
because {z ∈W ; z  ϕ} = {w, v} /∈ Nw.
Assume now that we leave our worlds and valuation without any changes but
we have certain modal relation R ⊆ W ×W and we use second clause to define
forcing of necessity. We want to say that w 1R ϕ (while w R (ϕ ∧ ψ)). It
gives us disjunction of two options. First, w 1R ϕ. Then w 1R ϕ ∧ ψ and thus
w 1R (ϕ∧ψ). Contradiction. Second, there is z ∈W such that wRz and z 1R ϕ.
Suppose that z is w. Then we repeat earlier reasoning. So, check z = v. If v 1R ϕ
and wRv then we cannot say that conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ is accepted in each world
R-visible from w. Thus, w 1R (ϕ ∧ ψ).
Of course this example is in fact classical - but undoubtedly it works fine with
our intuitionistic definitions.
4. Axiomatization of our system
In this section we present sound axiomatization of our logic. Below we show its
components:
Definition 4.1. The mIT -logic is the following set of formulas and rules: IPC ∪
{T ,MP } where:
(1) IPC is the set of all intuitionistic axiom schemes and their modal instances
(2) T is the axiom scheme ϕ→ ϕ
(3) MP is modus ponens: ϕ, ϕ ⊢ ψ ⊢ ψ
(4) RE is rule of extensionality: ϕ↔ ψ ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ
The following theorem holds:
Theorem 4.2. mIT is sound with respect to the class of all pn1 -models.
Proof. It is easy to check that axioms and rules of IPC are satisfied. Let us check
axiom T . Suppose that there is pn1 -model M with w ∈ W such that w 1 T .
Thus we have v ∈ W , w ≤ v such that v  ϕ but v 1 ϕ for certain ϕ. But from
the definition of forcing we have immediately that v  ϕ. Contradiction.
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
It can be fruitful to show explicitly that some well-known axioms and rules do
not hold in our structures:
(1) K : (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
Let us consider the following modelM = 〈W,N ,≤, V 〉: W = {s, c, v}, v ≤
s,Nv = {{s, c, v}},Ns = {{s}, {s, c, v}},Nc = {{c}}, V (ϕ) = {s} and
V (ψ) = {s, c}.
Now: v  (ϕ → ψ) because v  ϕ → ψ (note that v 1 ϕ and s 
ϕ → ψ) and {z ∈ W ; z  ϕ → ψ} = {s, c, v} ∈ Nv. On the other side,
v 1 ϕ → ψ. It is because we have s, v ≤ s such that s  ϕ and
s 1 ψ. The last thing comes from the fact that {s, c} /∈ Ns.
(2) RM (rule of monotonicity): ϕ→ ψ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ
Consider the following model: W = {w, v},Nw = {{w}},Nv = {{v}}, V (ϕ =
{w} and V (ψ) = {w, v}. Of course w  ϕ → ψ and the same for v. Now
w  ϕ because w  ϕ and {z ∈ W ; z  ϕ} = {v} ∈ Nv. At the same
time, w 1 ψ because {z ∈W ; z  ψ} = {v, z} /∈ Nv.
What is interesting, is the fact that D axiom holds, just like in classical case.
Recall that D is defined as ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ. Suppose now that there exist pn1 -model
M such that w ∈ W and w 1 D . Thus we have v ∈ W,w ≤ v such that v  ϕ
and v 1 ¬¬ϕ. Now v  ϕ and {z ∈W ; z  ϕ} ∈ Nv but there is also s ∈ W, v ≤ s
such that s  ¬ϕ. This means that s  ¬ϕ and {z ∈ W ; z  ¬ϕ} ∈ Ns. But if
v  ϕ then of course s  ϕ. Contradiction.
5. Completeness and canonical model
In this section we prove completeness of the systemmITwith respect to the class
of all pn1 -frames. At first, we introduce certain basic definitions and lemmas.
5.1. Useful lemmas.
Definition 5.1. mIT -theory is a set of well-formed formulas which contains all
axioms and is closed under deduction.
Attention: later we shall omit symbols mIT and pn1 for convenience. The next
lemma is quite standard and can be considered as a semantic version of deduction
theorem.
Lemma 5.2. (see [3], Lemma A.1)
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If w is a theory then ϕ→ ψ ∈ w ⇔ ψ ∈ v for all theories v such that w∪{ϕ} ⊆ v.
Proof. (sketch) The proof is easy. ⇒ direction requires only MP rule and ⇐ is
based on the analysis of set v = {ψ;ϕ→ ψ ∈ w} and axiom µ→ (ϕ→ µ). 
In the next point we introduce the notion of prime (or relatively maximal) theory,
repeating standard definition from intuitionistic calculus.
Definition 5.3. A theory w is said to be prime if it satisfies the following condi-
tions:
(1) ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ w ⇔ ϕ ∈ w or ψ ∈ w
(2) ⊥ /∈ w (i.e. w is consistent)
Lemma 5.4. Each consistent theory wγ (which does not contain formula γ) can
be extended to the prime theory w′γ .
Proof. (sketch) The proof is rather standard and it does not require any specific
features of our logic. The first thing is to use Lindenbaum’s lemma (or well-known
methods for countable languages) which allows us to extend wγ to the relatively
maximal w′γ . The second thing is to prove that w
′
γ is actually prime. It is enough to
prove that γ ∈ w′γ ∪ {ϕ} (resp. w
′
γ ∪ {ψ}) where by X we mean deductive closure
of the set of formulas X . It is important that we use semantic deduction theorem
in this proof. 
5.2. Canonical model.
Definition 5.5. can-pn1 (canonical neighborhood model) is a triple 〈W,N ,≤, V 〉
where:
(1) W is the set of all prime theories
(2) for every w, v ∈W we say that w ≤ v iff w ⊆ v
(3) N is a function from W into P (P (W )) such that for every w ∈W and for
each formula ϕ: Nw = {{z ∈W ;ϕ ∈ z};ϕ ∈ w}.
(4) V : PV → P (W ) is a function defined as it follows: w ∈ V (q)⇔ q ∈ w
Note that we can say:
Remark 5.6. In each can-pn1 -model: if X ⊆ W , then X ∈ Nw ⇔ there is a
formula ϕ such that X = {z ∈W ;ϕ ∈ z} and ϕ ∈ w.
Remark 5.7. In each can-pn1 -model: {z ∈W ;ϕ ∈ z} ∈ Nw ⇔ ϕ ∈ w.
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One could ask (see [6]) if it possible that {z ∈ W ;ϕ ∈ z} = {z ∈ W ;ψ ∈ z}
and ϕ ∈ w but ψ /∈ w. Surely, it would spoil our definition. Thus we prove the
following two lemmas:
Lemma 5.8. Assume that W is a collection of all prime theories of mIT . Suppose
now that {z ∈ W ;ϕ ∈ z} = {z ∈W ;ψ ∈ z}. Then ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ, i.e. ϕ↔ ψ ∈mIT .
Proof. Suppose that 0 ϕ ↔ ψ. We can assume (without loss of generality) that
0 ϕ→ ψ, so ϕ→ ψ /∈mIT . From lemma 5.2 there exists theory v such that ϕ ∈ v
but ψ /∈ v. By means of lemma 5.4 we can expand v to the prime theory t such
that ψ /∈ v (of course, ϕ ∈ t). But now t ∈ {z ∈ W ;ϕ ∈ z} - so, as we assumed,
t ∈ {z ∈ W ;ψ ∈ z}. Contradiction. 
Lemma 5.9. In can-pn1 -model 〈W,N ,≤, V 〉 we have the following property: for
each prime theory w, if {z ∈ W ;ϕ ∈ z} ∈ Nw and {z ∈ W ;ϕ ∈ z} = {z ∈ W ;ψ ∈
z}, then ψ ∈ w.
Proof. (see [6])
If {z ∈ W ;ϕ ∈ z} ∈ Nw then (from remark 5.7) ϕ ∈ w. From lemma 5.8 we
have that ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ. Thus, ϕ ↔ ψ ∈ mIT . By RE , also ϕ ↔ ψ ∈ mIT . In
particular, it means that ϕ↔ ψ ∈ w. Hence, ψ ∈ w.

Now we have the following lemma:
Lemma 5.10. can-pn1 is a well-defined pn1 -model.
Proof. What is really important to check, is the relation between ≤ and neighbor-
hoods. Suppose that w ⊆ v and v ∈ X ∈ Nw. By definition, X = {z ∈ W ;ϕ ∈ z}
for certain ϕ such that ϕ ∈ w. But if w ⊆ v, then ϕ ∈ v. Now we recall remark
5.6 to obtain the final result, that is: {z ∈W ;ϕ ∈ z} ∈ Nv. 
Below is the crucial lemma:
Lemma 5.11. (truth lemma) In can-pn1 -model we have for each ψ and for each
w ∈W : w  ϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ w.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the complexity of formula. There is one
non-trivial case where neighborhoods are involved: that of ϕ := ψ. (⇒). Suppose
that w  ψ. Thus w  ψ and {z ∈ W ; z  ψ} ∈ Nw. By induction, ψ ∈ w and
{z ∈W ;ψ ∈ z} ∈ Nw. The last statement means (by remark 5.7) that ψ ∈ w.
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(⇐). Assume that ϕ ∈ w. From T we have that ϕ ∈ w. Now by the definition
of N we can say that {z ∈ W ;ϕ ∈ z} ∈ w. But then (by induction hypothesis)
w  ϕ and {z ∈W ; z  ϕ} ∈ Nw. Thus w  ϕ. 
Theorem 5.12. mIT is complete with respect to the class of all pn1 -frames.
Proof. Suppose that w is a theory and w 0 ϕ. In particular this means that ϕ /∈ w.
Then we can extend w to the prime theory v such that w ⊆ v and ϕ /∈ v. Of
course for each ψ ∈ w, we have ψ ∈ v. Now we use lemma 5.11 to say that v  ψ
and v 1 ϕ. The last statement means in particular that ϕ is not a semantical
consequence of w. 
5.3. Additional restriction. Let us consider the following condition imposed on
our models:
(2) w ≤ v ⇒ Nw ⊆ Nv
This restriction is stronger than (1). We can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5.13. In can-pn1 -model condition (2) is valid.
Proof. Suppose that we have prime theories w, v such that w ⊆ v. Consider an
arbitrary X ∈ Nw. Of course, by the definition of neighborhood in canonical
model, X = {z ∈ W ;ϕ ∈ z} for certain ϕ such that ϕ ∈ w. If w ⊆ v, then
ϕ ∈ v. Thus X ∈ Nv. 
The last result means that we can limit completeness of mIT to the class of all
pn1 -frames satisfying (2). We shall call them pn2 -frames (models).
One could say that in the presence of (2) we may simplify our definition of forcing
- without violating monotonicity. In fact, we can introduce the following definition:
w  ϕ⇔ {z ∈ W ; z  ϕ} ∈ Nw
This approach is identical with the classical one. Note, however, that now we
have different logic which is not equivalent with mIT . For example, axiom T does
not hold. This system is just intuitionism with modal rule of extensionality.
6. Possibility operator
In this section we work with pn2 -frames. Our goal is to establish sensible notion
of possibility operator ∇. We propose the following definition:
w  ∇ϕ⇔ there are X ∈ Nw and z ∈ X such that z  ϕ
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Theorem 6.1. In every pn2 -model M = 〈W,N ,≤, V 〉: if w  ϕ and w ≤ v, then
v  ϕ.
Proof. Of course pn2 -models are subclass of pn1 -models. Thus we do not check
monotonicity for ∧,∨,→ and . But let us assume that w  ∇γ and w ≤ v. Then
there is X ∈ Nw such that for certain z ∈ X we have z  γ. Now X ∈ Nv so we
can say that v  ∇ϕ. 
Note that we have explicitly used the fact that Nw ⊆ Nv. One can check that
monotonicity of forcing holds (in pn2 -models) also with the following interpretation
of possibility:
w  ♦ϕ⇔ for each X ∈ Nw there is z ∈ X such that z  ϕ
However, the second approach is quite problematic. While ϕ → ∇ϕ is true,
then we cannot say the same about ϕ→ ♦ϕ. Roughly speaking,  guarantees us
that the set of all worlds satisfying ϕ is one of the w-neighborhoods. But it does
not guarantee that in each w-neighborhood we shall find world satisfying ϕ.
7. Question of axiom 4
Axiom 4 (i. e. ϕ → ϕ) is typical for propositional system S4 , introduced
by Lewis. In standard neighborhood setting for classical modal logics this formula
corresponds to the following condition (see [4]):
(⋆) X ∈ Nw ⇒ {v ∈W ;X ∈ Nv} ∈ Nw
We shall show that this restriction is too weak for characterization of 4 in our
environment. Let us consider the following pn1 -model M = {W,≤,N , V }:
W = {v, z, u},Nv = {{u, v}, {v, z}},Nz = {{u, v}, {v, z}},Nu = {{u}}, V (ϕ) =
{v, u}
One can easily check that M is a proper pn1 -model which satisfies (⋆). Now we
can say that v  ϕ because v  ϕ and {x ∈ W ;x  ϕ} = {v, u} ∈ Nv. On the
other hand, v 1 ϕ because {x ∈ W ;x  ϕ} = {v} /∈ Nv.
For this reason we have found another characterization:
Lemma 7.1. Axiom 4 holds in pn1 -model M iff M satisfies the following condi-
tion:
(⋆⋆) X ∈ Nw ⇒ (Y ⊆ X ⇒ (Y ∈ Nw))
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Proof. Assume that pn1 -model M = {W,≤,N , V } satisfies (⋆⋆) and there is w ∈
W such that w  ϕ. Hence, w  ϕ and X = {x ∈ W ;x  ϕ} ∈ Nw. But
Y = {x ∈ W ;x  ϕ} ⊆ X - and thus Y ∈ Nw. So by the definition of forcing
w  ϕ.
As for the other direction, we can use earlier counter-example. Clearly, it does
not satisfy (⋆⋆).

8. Further investigations
This paper should be considered only as a short introduction into research of
weak modal logics based on intuitionistic core. There are still many opened ques-
tions. For example, it would be interesting to obtain completeness results for weak
bi-modal intuitionistic logics, i.e. with possibility operator (defined as here or in a
different way). Also, it would be fruitful to characterize various frame conditions by
means of formulas (still with completeness). What is important from our point of
view, is to use additional tools (axioms, restrictions on frames etc.) without going
”too far”. In other words, we do not want ”too strong” logics (even if notions of
modal ”weakness” and ”strongness” are somewhat unclear or arbitrary). Finally,
there is also another interesting task: to combine modalities (and neighborhoods)
with subintuitionistic systems (in non-trivial way). As far as we know, the area of
subintuitionistic modal logics is almost terra incognita.
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